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Abstract 
This paper will analyse a survey on a range of firm-level case studies detailing the main de jure and 
de facto trade barriers that companies face in doing business in Southern Africa. Reference is made 
to previous studies on trade barriers within the region. The relevance of the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement to SADC going forward will also be assessed, following which recommendations will be 
made regarding the policy implications for SADC’s trade agenda as well as the development impact of 
measures to eliminate non-tariff barriers for SADC citizens. 
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Introduction 
 
“A broad definition of trade facilitation encompasses policies to reduce 
trade transaction costs, including “behind-the-border” policy reforms 
and the reduction of transaction costs resulting from cumbersome 
administrative customs, documentary requirements and border 
procedures that affect cross-border movement of goods and services. 
The term also covers simplification of the logistics, documentation and 
customs procedures involved in transiting goods through ports and land 
borders. It refers, too, to “domestic” policies and institutional structures 
that create an enabling environment for trade. Finally, it can take in 
harmonization of national and regional standards with international 
standards.”1 
Surveys are normally used where individual responses are required – in the present 
instance, different companies. ‘Surveys include the use of a questionnaire – an 
instrument specifically designed to elicit information that will be useful for analysis.’2 
The design of a survey should respond to both the research question and the aims of 
the study. The aim of the the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) 
and the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in conducting this 
survey was to identify key business constraints for firms operating in the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC).3 A secondary aim was to use the firm 
level data to open dialogue on policy choices to address the concerns of business 
                                                     
1
 UNECA ‘Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VI: Harmonizing Policies to Transform the Trading 
Environment’ 23.  
2
 Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Wadsworth 2010) 255. 
3
 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established in 1992 and is made up of 
15 Members. The SADC Protocol on Trade (1996) governs trade cooperation issues; Annex II of the 
Protocol deals specifically with trade facilitation. 
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people in SADC. Overall, the barriers identified are instrumental in informing 
policymakers about trade facilitation matters such that strategies can be devised to 
address them.  
This is not the first survey of its kind; various other surveys have been conducted 
with a view to assessing the ease of doing business in Southern Africa as well as 
identifying barriers to trade within the region.4 A common outcome of these surveys 
is that while policy recommendations were made following the analysis, these were 
not actioned; if so, this was left to the bare minimum. Indeed, some companies 
involved in the current survey expressed their misgivings about possible outcomes of 
the exercise, given the fact that they had already participated in more or less similar 
studies before, with little results.5 At this juncture, it will suffice to mention this point, 
as it will be expanded upon below.  
Nevertheless, what makes the present survey different from the rest is that it not only 
had the backing of SADC from the initial stage, but also because the SADC 
Secretariat was instrumental in helping to conduct the exercise. Appeal to SADC 
was made in writing up the results of the interviews that the researchers conducted. 
This was done particularly for clarification or edification; for instance, on Regional 
Transit Bonds. Not much has been written about them, but they could provide a 
remarkable example of how to use regional initiatives for the benefit of the private 
                                                     
4
 Some of these surveys include the following: World Bank Regional Investment Climate Assessment 
for SADC; World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index; World Bank Ease of Doing 
Business Survey; Ernst & Young Africa Attractiveness Survey; World Bank Enterprise Surveys; 
Business Climate Assessments by the Southern African Regional Poverty Network (SARPN), 
Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASCCI) and Afrika‐Verein. Some of 
these will be discussed below. 
5
 For example, Lobatse Clay Works indicated that they had participated in similar surveys before, but 
since nothing had come of it, they did not feel that another survey would add any value. The case 
study is available at: SAIIA, GIZ ‘Lobatse Clay Works’ http://www.thetradebeat.com/sadc-business-
case-studies/lobatse-clay-works.  
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sector.6 Whether or not this will translate into tangible policy results within the short 
to medium term is yet to be seen. 
The present author dealt with the materials generated by various researchers across 
the spectrum of survey companies in 2012 and since then watched the development 
of the case studies over the years. Consultations were held with some of the 
researchers as well as survey coordinators in order to arrive at conclusions that 
hinge on the primary data, specifically with respect to the more nuanced aspects. 
There is a lot that can still be deciphered from the study output to form 
generalisations and paint a picture within which to analyse trade facilitation issues 
within SADC.  
Survey Description 
 
Sampling 
Data collection is necessary to test a hypothesis. Hence, the manner in which 
research subjects are selected is very important as it influences the quality of the 
research produced.7 ‘The purposive sampling technique, also called judgment 
sampling, is the deliberate choice of an informant due to the qualities the informant 
possesses.’8 In this type of sampling, the researcher makes a deliberate choice 
regarding who to speak to in order to collect information to answer their research 
question. Purposive sampling can either be selective or theoretical. Selective 
                                                     
6
 See Case Study 6: Regional Transit Bonds in Lesley Wentworth  “Regional Business Barriers: 
Unlocking Economic Potential in Southern Africa”  available at http://www.saiia.org.za/news/regional-
business-barriers-unlocking-economic-potential-in-southern-africa.  
7
 Imelda T. Coyne, ‘Sampling in qualitative research. Purposeful and theoretical sampling; merging or 
clear boundaries?’ (1997) 26 Journal of Advanced Nursing 623, 623. 
8
 Maria Dolores C. Tongco, ‘Purposive Sampling as a Tool for Informant Selection’ [2007] , 147. 
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sampling is a deliberate choice of subjects based on preconceived ideas, while 
theoretical sampling refers to the choice of subjects based on a developing sample.9 
During an interview, one of the lead researchers on the project, Ms Lesley 
Wentworth, revealed that the entire interview process was not conducted using a 
cookie cutter approach.10 General guidelines and a simple questionnaire were 
produced to allow for uniform responses to be collected. This form was sent out to 
various companies within the SADC region with a number of consultants contracted 
to SAIIA. The companies were chosen in concert with the regional business 
organisations that SAIIA and GIZ worked with on this project.11 It lends credit to the 
researchers that they eventually found a way to synergise and present the data they 
collected in a uniform format.   
In a purposive sample, respondents to the survey must be competent to answer 
questions.12 The present study used responses from relevant senior employees 
and/or proprietors at the firms under surveillance. At face value, they are all 
competent to answer questions. This helps in the external validation of the accuracy 
and relevancy of responses to the research question. The choice of survey 
respondents who have recent experience is important for two reasons.13 Firstly, their 
answers, being based on recent experience, will be more accurate. Secondly, people 
with recent experience may be more willing to talk about it. 
                                                     
9
 Coyne, ‘Sampling in qualitative research. Purposeful and theoretical sampling; merging or clear 
boundaries?’ 628. 
10
 Lesley Wentworth is the Programme Manager for the Economic Diplomacy Programme at the 
South African Institute of International Affairs. She can be reached at lesley.wentworth @saiia.org.za. 
11
 These include the Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASCCI); the South 
African Chamber of Mines; The SADC Truckers Association and the Southern African Generic 
Medicines Association (SAGMA) among others.  
12
 Babbie, The Practice of Social Research 258. 
13
 C. Sibona and S. Walczak, ‘Purposive Sampling on Twitter: A Case Study’, January 2012 3514. 
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Nevertheless, purposive sampling is replete with bias. This is because the 
researcher chooses specific people to answer a specific set of questions. The bias is 
further amplified by the researcher’s ‘assumption’ regarding the validity and reliability 
of responses prior to receiving results of the survey given the position of each of the 
respondents. Conversely, a random sample tends to ‘externally validate the data 
collected’ since the sample is considered less-biased than that in purposive 
samples.14 All the same, it can also be argued that the strength of the purposive 
sampling method lies in its internal bias. Prior knowledge of one’s sources, area of 
study and audience are essential in facilitating the greatest reliability.15 This also 
goes on to inform one’s choice of research subjects. It follows, therefore, that one 
should pay attention to research design in order to reduce bias in results.16 
Babbie suggests various strategies in which survey questions can be framed in order 
to ensure accuracy and reliability of data collected during the research project.17 
Questions should be framed clearly.18 This means that, where possible, relevant 
terms should be explained. Furthermore, the simplest configuration should be used 
since the conception of something from one place to another can be different. This is 
especially important given the fact that various languages are used in business 
across Southern Africa, including the use of English, Portuguese and French. 
Respondents must also be willing to answer questions.19 It can be assumed that the 
respondents to the survey were willing to answer questions since they are referred to 
by name in the text. Additionally, the naming of the companies is essential because 
                                                     
14
 Tongco, ‘Purposive Sampling as a Tool for Informant Selection’ 154. 
15
 Barbara A. Kitchenham and Shari Lawrence Pfleeger, ‘Principles of Survey Research Part 2: 
Designing a Survey’ (2002) 27 SIGSOFT Softw. Eng. Notes 18, 19. 
16
 Kate Kelley, Belinda Clark, Vivienne Brown, and John Sitzia, ‘Good practice in the conduct and 
reporting of survey research’ (2003) 15 International Journal for Quality in Health Care 261, 263. 
17
 See generally Babbie, The Practice of Social Research 256–266. 
18
 Babbie, The Practice of Social Research 257. 
19
 Babbie, The Practice of Social Research 259. 
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the results can be attributed directly to certain participants, operating within a 
particular geographical area and facing a specific set of constraints. It is envisaged 
that in deciding on new policies, SADC would then be better able to respond to the 
specific requirements of each sector.  
 
Ethics 
The term ethics refers to the philosophy of what is right and wrong.20 Research 
centres on the production and testing of new knowledge. As such, it is important that 
the research findings be true as well as reliable.  Validity of research data measures 
the accuracy of the data collected; reliability measures the extent to which the same 
research project can be replicated elsewhere.21 Essentially, both concepts imply the 
need for the application of a rigorous approach to the research process in order to 
generate composite empirical research output. Other researchers prefer to use the 
terms dependability and integrity as they deem them to be a more accurate reflection 
of the measurement of the overall research design and process.22 It is important to 
note, however, that what is deemed morally upright or ethical will vary both from one 
group and from one situation to another.  
In order to protect the identity of the survey participants, care must be taken to 
ensure confidentiality of results.23 This does not necessarily apply in the present 
case where the research essentially hinges on accurate reporting by the target 
                                                     
20
 Adil E. Shamoo and Cheryl D. Dunigan, ‘Ethics in Research’ (2000) 224 Experimental Biology and 
Medicine 205, 205. 
21
 T. Long and M. Johnson, ‘Rigour, reliability and validity in qualitative research’ (2000) 4 Clinical 
Effectiveness in Nursing 30, 30–31. 
22
 Long and Johnson, ‘Rigour, reliability and validity in qualitative research’ 31–32. See further on 
Page 33-34 for other alternative terms as well as strategies to facilitate rigour in research.  
23
 Babbie, The Practice of Social Research 67. For a brief discussion on the ethical dimensions of 
research, particularly in relation to protecting research subjects, see Denis Walsh and Soo Downe, 
‘Appraising the quality of qualitative research’ (2006) 22 Midwifery 108–119. 
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companies. Being a purposive sample that was carefully selected from a small pool 
also necessitates the need to disclose the identity of the survey participants and 
and/or respondents.   
The survey under examination was conducted with full disclosure to survey 
participants with respect to the nature of the information required as well as the 
manner in which said information would be utilised and disseminated.24 It follows 
from this that the researcher tried to protect the integrity of survey participants. Even 
in detailing the responses given by each of the survey participants, the author 
presents the information in a matter-of-fact way with no obvious evidence of 
exaggeration or embellishment. The names of companies which responded have 
also been recorded, allowing anyone who seeks to clarify certain points to be able to 
contact the relevant firm and ask for further details.  
Results of Previous Studies 
 
As alluded to above, some studies on key constraints to doing business in SADC 
have been conducted by other actors. This paper will not attempt to discuss all other 
similar studies, but will focus on a few of the most relevant in this context.  
 
World Bank Regional Investment Climate Assessment of SADC25  
This research was designed to assess the level of integration in SADC as well as 
trade flows within the region. The study found that in 2011, although SADC’s share 
                                                     
24
 The results of the survey have been published at: http://www.thetradebeat.com/sadc-business-
case-studies.  
25
 Alberto Behar and Lawrence Edward, ‘How Integrated Is SADC? Trends in Intra-Regional and 
Extra-Regional Trade Flows and Policy’ (The World Bank 2011). 
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of world trade had fallen, overall trade within the region had increased, dispelling 
fears that the region is not well-integrated.26 With respect to non-tariff barriers to 
trade, it was found that, based on the level of development in the region,  although 
“obstacles to trade are high, … the overall trading environment and market access 
and border administration in particular (but not transport and communications 
infrastructure) are on average better in the SADC region than the rest of the world.”27 
An important point raised in this study is that the landlocked countries in SADC will 
need to go a lot further in addressing these non-tariff barriers because they stand to 
lose out on a lot more trade without such reforms.28 This particular observation is 
interesting because it highlights how peculiar local conditions should influence the 
manner in which both business people and policymakers consider how they assess 
the trading environment. Benchmarking SADC against regions with similar levels of 
development reveals a larger spectrum of constraints than would be assessed in a 
single region. The concerns raised with transport and communications infrastructure 
have also come up within the SAIIA studies, and these will be discussed below.  
 
Afrika-Verein SADC Business Climate 2010/11 Outlook 201229 
Afrika-Verein conducts business climate surveys to assess the performance and 
business constraints of German firms operating in SADC - this was Afrika-Verein’s 
sixth such study. It is interesting that for the first time, the focus of the Afrika-Verein 
study was on was not only on German business, but also on business from the 
BRICS countries. This is an important digression from practice because it allows for 
                                                     
26
 Ibid at 4. 
27
 Ibid at 19. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Rand Merchant Bank and Afrika-Verein ‘SADC Business Climate 2010/1:1 Outlook 2012’ (2011). 
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a different kind of comparative analysis to be followed. The main challenges to 
conducting business in the region were the following: skills shortages, crime and 
corruption, as well as an uncertain regulatory environment.30 55,4% percent of the 
survey respondents were satisfied with the business environment in SADC. The fact 
that less than 7 % considered the business environment to be unconducive is 
testimony to improvements in the business climate.31 Nevertheless, the challenges 
they raised need to be addressed in order for there to be greater satisfaction 
amongst firms conducting business in the region.  
 
Private Sector Involvement in African Regional Economic Integration (2011)32 
This research was an assessment of private sector participation in economic policy 
design at the regional level within the EAC, ECOWAS and SADC. Private sector 
involvement is essential in assisting policymakers to design policies responsive to 
the needs of business people within the region. This is one of the fundamental points 
raised by the SADC Business Case Studies. Any policy deliberations that do not take 
into account the concerns of the private sector, to which much of the outcomes will 
apply, falls short of its mark. The study noted that while it was found desirable by 
both the private sector and government to engage at this level, the problem is that 
none of the regional bodies “has a defined policy for what decision at what stage of 
the process which kind of private sector organisation has to be involved and has a 
                                                     
30
Ibid at 10. 
31
 Ibid at 8. 
32
 GIZ, ‘Private Sector Involvement in African Regional Economic Integration’ 
(2011)http://www2.gtz.de/wbf/4tDx9kw63gma/GIZ_NEDA_PS_Involvement_in_REI_final.pdf.  
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voice in the decision making process.”33 Such a situation lends itself to inefficient and 
unresponsive decision-making at the regional policy level.  
Article 23 of the SADC Treaty provides that the non-governmental organisations and 
associations shall be involved in integration processes.34 This was further amplified 
in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), which is the 
blueprint for SADC’s integration and development agenda.35 This means that the 
private sector’s involvement in decision making was envisaged from the 
establishment of SADC and should inform its processes.  
 
Ernst and Young (EY) Attractiveness Survey 201436 
EY Attractiveness Surveys are designed to assess the investment climate of a region 
with a view to assisting investors to make viable business decisions, while at the 
same time ensuring that governments respond to various barriers faced by investors 
locally. The current survey is the fourth such instalment by Ernst and Young. Unlike 
the other studies which are pitched at analysing firm-level responses, the EY Survey 
compiles the views of a cross section of local and international opinion leaders. This 
is a strength in that it allows the flourishing of independent opinions; however, there 
is a danger that some of the views may be removed from the reality on the ground.  
The EY Survey noted that while significant progress has been made in addressing 
the concerns of investors in Africa, “perceptions about the continent often remain 
                                                     
33
 The benefits of public-sector participation in policymaking are described on pages 3-10 of the 
Report. These include greater legitimacy for decisions made, an easier climate for implementation 
and influencing regionl processes and policies amongst others.  
34
 Art. 23 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community. 
35
 SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf.  
36
 Ernst and Young ‘EY Attractiveness Survey: Africa 2014’ 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-attractiveness-africa-2014/$FILE/EY-attractiveness-
africa-2014.pdf.  
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stuck in the past.”37 It is this perception gap which needs to be addressed before 
significant progress can be made in other spheres. The view of Africa as a Dark 
Continent which needs to be saved has been held for a long time. The emergence of 
the narrative of Africa as the last economic frontier is a direct contrast to this. 
Relative to other destinations, Africa is now seen as a prime investment 
destination.38 Nevertheless, while African FDI in-flows have increased in the last 
decade, they still form less than 5% of global flows.39 
 
Phase I 
 
During Phase I of the survey, the questionnaire was sent to 90 companies based on 
recommendations from various business associations that the researchers 
approached prior to conducting the survey. Following the survey, 45 of the case 
studies were then published online after rigorous verification.40  
                                                     
37
 This is also evident in the manner in which some companies in the Business Case Studies dismiss 
certain incidents as being part of the fabric of African business practice. 
38
 EY Attractiveness Survey ‘EY Attractiveness Survey’ Africa ranked 2
nd
 overall in the current survey. 
39
 Ibid 5. 
40
 These can be accessed here: SAIIA “Business Case Studies” http://www.thetradebeat.com/sadc-
business-case-studies.  
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Source: http://www.thetradebeat.com/sadc-business-case-studies/dhl (Author’s 
formatting) 
 
While the survey was being carried out, a list of then top ten barriers to doing 
business in SADC was computed using national and regional case studies that had 
been conducted by other entities prior to the present study. From this analysis, the 
top ten business barriers that were identified were: 
1. Access to and cost of finance. 
2. Tax rates and/or administration (including direct and indirect taxes, double 
taxation policies and harmonisation). 
3. Access to skilled labour (including issues related to the free movement of people 
in the region). 
4. Economic and regulatory policy uncertainty. 
Sample Case Study: DHL 
 
Barriers: border control, work permits, corruption, inadequate infrastructure, forex 
shortages, bureaucracy 
Response: strict anti-corruption policy; engages with government regularly; tried to engage 
with SADC but not much headway 
Suggest: SADC Business Visa; willing to share expertise; SADC Guidelines on Work 
Permits; IT and satellite technology to reduce border delays; Mauritius as an example of 
best practice 
 
14 
 
5. Fluctuations of the exchange rate/foreign currency regulations, including with 
respect to remittances. 
6. Customs regulations, procedures and bureaucracy. 
7. Supply of reliable and efficient infrastructure, including transport, 
telecommunications, IT and energy. 
8. Corruption. 
9. Inefficient bureaucracy, including transparency of rules and regulations, business 
licensing and investment permits. 
10. Non-tariff and other trade barriers, including TBT, SPS and SQAM issues.41 
Once the information from the case studies was distilled and cross-referenced with 
the previous desk analysis results, it emerged that the top barriers mentioned by 
each of the respondents were: customs regulations; infrastructure; access to skilled 
labour; inefficient bureaucracy; corruption; and access to finance.42  
                                                     
41
 For a more detailed analysis, see Catherine Grant-Makokera, Geoffrey Chapman, Lesley 
Wentworth “Top 10 Business Constraints in SADC: An Analysis of Business and Investment Climate 
Surveys” http://www.thetradebeat.com/sadc-articles/top-10-business-constraints-identified-in-the-
sadc-region. 
42
 Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott; Catherine Grant-Makokera; David Graf “Making Key Business 
Constraints in SADC Tangible: Experiences of the Private Sector” 4 
http://www.thetradebeat.com/doc_download/5-making-business-constraints-tangible.  
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Source: Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott; Catherine Grant-Makokera; David Graf “Making 
Key Business Constraints in SADC Tangible: Experiences of the Private Sector” 
It is interesting that corruption came up so strongly in the survey. In fact, two 
contrasting perspectives emerge in the manner in which certain firms deal with 
corruption; for example, DB Schenker, a German logistics concern and Vodacom, a 
South African telecommunications company. According to DB Schenker, customs 
regulations and procedures are viewed as being “of no concern because these are 
basic directives which they have to adhere to as any other law-abiding citizens”.43 
However, in the same breath, “corruption was described as an African habitual 
practice which does exist and will always be there.”44 It is rather peculiar that a 
company professing to uphold the law would be so flippant about corruption. One 
would not be remiss in arguing that such utterances could be the result of having 
engaged in one form of corruption or another. Vodacom on the other hand “employs 
a strict anti-corruption policy in the hope that this will eventually send significant 
signals to the region that corruption is not in anyone’s interest and that business in 
                                                     
43
 SAIIA, GIZ “DB Schenker” http://www.thetradebeat.com/sadc-business-case-studies/db-schenker. 
44
 Ibid. 
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Africa can be done without bribery.”45 It is hoped that more businesses will engage in 
this philosophy while doing business in Southern Africa as this would ultimately 
reduce the barriers they face and encourage more investment in the region.  
The SADC Protocol Against Corruption was signed in 2001 to assist in the detection, 
prevention and combatting of corruption regionally. Corruption hampers 
development, particularly in developing countries. “It exacerbates all the other 
problems that beset the region. It frustrates and impedes all efforts to solve those 
problems.”  This means that legitimate policy goals will be derailed where corruption 
is rife. Efforts to redress corrupt practices will also fail since corruption will form part 
of the fabric of the operating environment. Therefore it is not enough to merely have 
anti-corruption laws and policies in place. Rather, care must be taken to ensure that 
policing mechanisms are utilised effectively to combat the scourge. The SADC 
Lawyers Association has commissioned a study on the implementation of the Anti-
Corruption Protocol.  It will be interesting to see what the outcome of this study will 
be, particularly with respect to the effects that corruption has on trade within the 
region. 
SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) 
 
The SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) was adopted by 
the SADC Summit in 2003 as a blueprint for the regional integration agenda of 
SADC from 2005-2020.46 “The ultimate objective of the plan is to deepen integration 
in the region with a view to accelerate poverty eradication and the attainment of 
                                                     
45
 SAIIA, GIZ “Vodacom (South Africa)” http://www.thetradebeat.com/sadc-business-case-
studies/vodacom-south-africa.  
46
 SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (2003) http://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf.  
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other economic and non-economic development goals.”47 Or particular relevance to 
this paper is the trade facilitation and integration agenda which also encompasses a 
development agenda. 
SADC has six landlocked countries.48 However, they do have access to ports in 
neighbouring countries: Zambia to Dar-es-Salaam, Botswana to Walvis Bay, Malawi 
to Nacala, Zimbabwe to Beira, and Lesotho and Swaziland to Durban. While these 
are the closest ports to these territories, Durban is the “container hub port for 
Southern Africa”.49 The dominance of South Africa’s busiest port in the region means 
less traffic goes to other ports in the region. The extensive road network in Southern 
Africa allows for goods to move relatively easily from one country to another. While 
the quality of roads varies in the region, the major transport corridors are paved: the 
North-South Corridor from Durban to Dar-es-Salaam, the Trans-Kalahari Corridor 
from Walvis Bay to; Maputo Corridor; and the Dar-es-Salaam Corridors.50 
Nevertheless, border delays and cumbersome customs procedures lead to slow 
movement of goods across borders. As a result, SADC has “the highest cost for 
transporting goods in the world”, with up to 40% of the price of goods traded in the 
region being made up of transport costs.51 This in turn shows that many of the non-
tariff barriers to trade in the region work together to hamper the flow of goods at a 
faster rate than could be occasioned otherwise.  
                                                     
47
 SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan http://www.sadc.int/about-
sadc/overview/strategic-pl/regional-indicative-strategic-development-plan/.  
48
 Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland. 
49
 Peter Draper and Sören Scholvin, “The Economic Gateway to Africa? Geography, Strategy and 
South Africa’s Regional Economic Relations” SAIIA Occasional Paper 121 (2012) 37. 
50
 See for further details: SADC Regional Infrastucture Development Master Plan: Transport Sector 
Plan (2012) 
http://www.sadc.int/files/9313/5293/3536/Regional_Infrastructure_Development_Master_Plan_Transp
ort_Sector_Plan.pdf 40.  
51
 Bank of Tanzania “Intra-SADC Trade in Goods and Services (Including Assessing the Condition for 
the Dynamism of Intra-regional Trade)” (2014). 
https://www.sadcbankers.org/Lists/News%20and%20Publications/Attachments/194/SADC%20PAPE
R%20-FINAL%20FOR%20WEBSITE%20%28intra%20trade%29.pdf 12. 
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The SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology seeks to 
establish efficient forms of transport, communication and meteorology within the 
region.52 The driving force of the Protocol is increased regional cooperation in these 
sectors. Should these be improved, there is greater scope to implement the Protocol 
on Trade, particularly with respect to trade facilitation. The Chirundu One-stop 
Border post offers a useful study into how border procedures can be reduced; 
allowing for increased and faster movement of freight transport, informal traders and 
the general public between Zambia and Zimbabwe.53 In order to test the feasibility of 
reducing border procedures and improve trade gains through improved efficiency, a 
One Stop Border Post (OSBP) was established at Chirundu – between Zimbabwe 
and Zambia - in 2009. North bound traffic (both passenger and freight) is cleared on 
the Zambian side of the border, while South bound traffic is cleared in Zimbabwe. 
Since the inauguration of the border, the clearance period for trucks has been 
reduced from 2-3 days to only 2-3 hours; while passengers are able to clear the 
border within 15 minutes.54 The improved efficiencies at the OSBP ensure that there 
is quicker movement of goods and people across the borders, which translates to 
increased welfare gains for consumers downstream. Should more OSBPs be 
established within the region, increased intra-regional trade and greater economies 
of scale could result.  Southern Africa’s busiest border is at Beitbridge, across the 
Limpopo River between Zimbabwe and South Africa.55 It would be highly beneficial 
to create a one-stop border at this port and help reduce delays and the high level of 
traffic; however, for the same reason, it would also be a rather uphill task.  
                                                     
52
 SADC SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology 
http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/815. 
53
 Read generally Barney Curtis, “The Chirundu Border Post: Detailed Monitoring of Transit Times” 
(2012) http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAFRSUBSAHTRA/Resources/DP10-Chirundu.pdf.  
54
 Habiba Ben Barka “Border Posts, Checkpoints, and Intra-African Trade: Challenges and Solutions” 
(2012) 12. 
55
 Ibid at 7. 
19 
 
SADC is deemed to have better infrastructure than other regions in Africa, however, 
there is need to improve what is already there before adequate gains can be made.56  
“If Southern Africa’s infrastructure could be improved to the level of the strongest-
performing country in Africa (Mauritius), regional per capita growth performance 
would be boosted by some 3 percentage points.”57 This means that trade volumes 
within SADC would grow, while facilitating increased exports to other regions 
worldwide.58 However, such expansion and upgrading of infrastructure at a region-
wide level would need a lot of capital investment and perhaps even more time - “$2.1 
billion a year over the course of a decade.”59 Even more funding would be required 
to maintain the infrastructure once it is completed.  
Even if the challenge of infrastructure development is addressed, training has to be 
conducted to bring policies and procedures in line with what physical structures are 
in place to facilitate trade. Constructing more one-stop border posts will not 
automatically translate to shorter waiting times for truckers or passengers – 
personnel at these posts need to see and experience policies coming alive not just at 
the regional level, but also at the national level, where much of the implementation 
will occur.  
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Phase II60 
 
Phase II of the Case Studies project looked at ways in which some more immediate 
problems could be addressed. While a lot has been written in the academic context, 
GIZ sought to engage in targeted interventions in order to unblock some of the 
barriers that traders experienced across borders.61 This was important since any 
changes at the policy level would only be realised after a few years at the very least. 
Short term interventions with a shorter turnaround time can help ease certain 
processes along the trading chain and hopefully catapult macro-level changes in the 
long term.  
Just as in Phase I, SAIIA and GIZ engaged the participating regional business 
organisations to pick out a few barriers to focus on in the crafting of targeted 
intervention measures.  Engaging with these regional bodies ensured that the 
proposed solutions were in line with what industry itself required. Furthermore, 
crafting these solutions meant that the results of the survey went further than other 
studies by actively engaging with survey participants post-survey in order to firmly 
address their concerns. The work has only just begun; hence it will be interesting to 
see how far the process of engagement goes beyond 2014.  
An example of the approach used in the second phase of the study can be seen in 
the manner in which the SADC Bankers Association was approached in order to find 
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out how to level the playing field for small to medium scale farmers in Malawi who 
had problems with access to finance.62 This initiative led to the hosting of a dialogue 
in Malawi, bringing together multilateral development institutions,63 commercial 
bankers, microfinance institutions and the agricultural producers – essentially all 
relevant stakeholders. The idea behind this dialogue was to bring together all 
relevant stakeholders in order for them to talk about the problems the farmers were 
experiencing in obtaining capital for their projects and try to find solutions that work 
for all parties involved.  
SADC’s Engagement of the Private Sector 
 
The RISDP’s implementation plan envisaged engaging the private sector in regional 
integration initiatives.64 ASCII White Paper on Economic Policy Issues as a blueprint 
for engaging the private sector.65 However, the modalities of this implementation 
were never realised. Unfortunately, SADC only operated a private sector desk 
between 2003 and 2005.66 This means that a lot of opportunities to engage with the 
private sector have not been harnessed. Perhaps this is what contributes to the 
lethargy to engage with SADC by some private sector players as they would feel that 
the regional body is not championing their cause effectively.  
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Ms Wentworth noted that while many commentators have maintained that a stronger 
private sector will bring about a more robust regional integration agenda, the key to 
achieving this would be to organise it better.67 The moves to create a regional apex 
body for all business organisations in the region are responsive to this need. An 
institutionally sound apex body would give the private sector more leverage in terms 
of engaging with SADC as well as other policy and regulatory bodies in Southern 
Africa.  
SADC wanted the apex body to be set up within its Secretariat. However, given the 
institutional weakness of SADC as well as the potential for the new body to be mired 
in bureaucracy, this was not deemed to be a viable solution. A potential solution is to 
house the apex body within the NEPAD Business Foundation. A meeting is to be 
held in Gaborone, Botswana, to flesh out this idea and hopefully launch the new 
regional apex business body to champion the cause of the private sector. 68 
In an effort to facilitate dialogue between the private sector and the Secretariats of 
COMESA, the EEC and SADC, TradeMark Southern Africa (TMSA) established the 
Mechanism for Reporting, Monitoring & Eliminating Non-Tariff Barriers.69 Through 
this mechanism, private sector operators could report any non-tariff barriers they 
faced in their operations within the region. The barriers would then be passed onto 
the relevant SADC country for resolution. Companies have been very efficient at 
reporting non-tariff barriers, but their resolution has been lagging behind.70 The 
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future of the mechanism was unsure since the DFID-funded TMSA project has come 
to an end.71 However, COMESA has since taken over its management.72  
Conclusion 
 
The goal of the case studies was not only to create possibilities to influence regional 
policy, but also to facilitate the crafting of practical solutions to some of the barriers 
faced by companies conducting business in SADC and to engage in a form of 
advocacy on behalf of traders in the region. It will be interesting to see how further 
dialogues between various stakeholders are organised in order to address some of 
the concerns raised by business people in the region.  
One of the most important outcomes of the 9th WTO Ministerial Meeting in Bali in 
2013 was the negotiation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA).73 Hong 
Kong, China was the first country to ratify the TFA; however, it will only come into 
effect after two thirds of WTO Members ratify it.74 WTO Director-General, Roberto 
Azevêdo, has averred that the implementation of the TFA will benefit Africa through 
increased regional integration.75 Trade facilitation will increase Africa’s 
competitiveness. Indeed, it will boost the gains to be made from investments in 
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infrastructure, particularly in the transport sector.76  However, there is still need for 
greater political commitment and follow through in terms of operationalising the 
mandate of the Agreement.  
Companies need to go into Southern Africa with an opportunity-focused approach 
which factors in relevant risks instead of assuming that the landscape will be difficult 
to operate in even without any experience of this. On this point, EY research 
indicates that “on some key indicators, the much-vaunted BRIC countries are more 
risky or more difficult than many important African markets.”77 
Only through increased integration can SADC achieve the gains that would turn it 
into a real economic powerhouse. The regional body also needs to engage better 
with the private sector in order to address concerns specific to them. SADC has 
discussed and adopted various policy documents aimed at facilitating trade,78 but 
implementation still lags behind. 
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